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The age at which children leave the parental home differs considerably across countries. We 
present a theoretical model predicting that higher job security of parents and lower job 
security of children may delay emancipation. We then provide aggregate evidence which 
supports this hypothesis for 12 European countries. We also give microeconometric evidence 
for Italy, the single country for which we have access to household-specific information on 
job security and coresidence. It is a very interesting case to study since, in the late 1990s, 
approximately 75 per cent of young Italians aged 18 to 35 were living at home and they had 
only a 4 per cent probability of emancipation in the subsequent 3 years. We show that this 
probability would have increased by 4 to 10 percentage points if their fathers had gone from 
having a fully secure job to becoming unemployed for sure. 
JEL classification: J1, J2. 
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 1 Introduction
The age at which children decide to leave the parental home diﬀers considerably across
countries. For instance, while in 2002 coresidence rates for males aged 25 to 29 years
old were 20% in the Netherlands, 21% in the UK, and 22% in Ireland, in Italy this rate
was as high as 73% (reaching a staggering 91% for males aged 20 to 24 years old). Close
to this Italian record are other southern European countries like Greece and Spain,
with coresidence rates of 70% and 67%, respectively, but also a Nordic country like
Finland, where it was also equal to 73%. Such huge disparities across countries, which
are observed in the analogous ﬁgures for females as well, call for an explanation.
The economic literature on this issue has focused on variables such as parents’ and
children’s incomes, including unemployment, and on the sharing of public goods, such
as housing, through coresidence. Empirical ﬁndings for the US and the UK indicate
that parents provide their children with insurance against poor labor market opportu-
nities (see, for instance, McElroy, 1985, Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993, or Ermish, 1996
and 1999). Several recent studies have analyzed the late emancipation age in southern
European countries. For Italy, Manacorda and Moretti (2003) emphasize the income
of parents, who are portrayed as bribing their children to stay at home longer, while
Giannelli and Monfardini (2003) focus on the negative eﬀect of housing costs on eman-
cipation. The Spanish case is studied by Martinez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002),
who also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of housing costs, and it inspires the theoretical model
of D´ ıaz and Guill´ o (2003), which stresses the mother’s housework as a public good in-
ducing children to stay. In an international investigation, Ghidoni (2002) ﬁnds very few
empirical regularities on the determinants of moving out across countries.
In this paper, we focus on one additional factor which has not received much at-
tention so far, namely the degree of job security enjoyed by youths and their parents.
Fogli (2000) has called attention to high parental job security as a determinant of late
youth emancipation. She presents a model in which, due to credit market imperfections,
granting high job protection to older workers is welfare improving. Young people remain
1with their parents, whose jobs are very secure, proﬁting from household consumption
(a public good), thus avoiding the credit constraints they would face if they lived alone
and went out to work.
While starting from her intuition, our interest in analyzing empirical evidence leads
us to pursue a diﬀerent model. Speciﬁcally, we study the residential decision of a child
of altruistic parents in a dynamic setup; the child may stay or leave in a given period,
but if she stays she gets the chance of revising her decision in the future (moving out is
irreversible). Contrary to Fogli’s model, the child may choose to work while coresiding
with her parents. Further, we assume that she gets a higher fraction of family income
while at home, but altruistic parents will still provide transfers to a poor but independent
child. Lastly, in our setup there is uncertainty concerning the child’s and the parents’
future income. Our model, therefore, allows us to understand the roles of uncertainty
and altruism on the child’s residential decision, issues which are mostly absent in Fogli’s
setup given the general-equilibrium nature of her work.
We show that, for forward-looking children who are considering emancipation, given
the irreversibility of moving out, staying home with the parents has an option value
associated with waiting to see the realization of future incomes and deciding then whether
or not to leave. Depending on her own and her parents’ future income, a child who moved
out may come to regret that she did. In the presence of partial altruism, there will be
regret even if parents are wealthy enough to provide ﬁnancial transfers to independent
children. We also show that the joint consideration of parental and child’s job security is
a relevant explanatory factor for youth emancipation. In particular, we will argue that,
under certain conditions, children’s job insecurity lowers the probability that they leave
home, while parental job insecurity raises it.
To test the eﬀect of job insecurity on coresidence rates, we look ﬁrst at macro data.
In Section 3 we show that the aggregate evidence for 12 European Union (EU) countries
in the 1980s and 1990s is consistent with our hypothesis. Micro-econometric evidence
is given in Section 4 but only for Italy, the single country for which we have access to
household-speciﬁc information on job insecurity and coresidence. We exploit the panel
2data structure of the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), collected
by the Bank of Italy, which contains high quality data on individual-speciﬁc perceived
job insecurity for 1995. Our particular sample and empirical strategy are described in
detail in Sections 4.1-4.3. We estimate linear probability and probit models for whether
children live independently after a given year, 1995, as a function of indicators of parental
and child’s job insecurity, and of a set of control variables measuring demographic,
educational, and labor market characteristics of the children and their fathers (as well
as other family background indicators). Very few papers in this literature have exploited
in a similar way the panel structure of available microeconomic datasets. Indeed most
papers present just cross-sectional evidence.
For parents, we use the answers to a question on the individual’s perceived likelihood
of having a job in the subsequent 12 months to construct an indicator of job insecurity.
The high quality of this information is another valuable aspect of our data. Unfortu-
nately this question was asked only to a randomly chosen 50% of the households, which
leaves us with a small sample. In order to increase sample size, we impute perceived job
insecurity to individuals who were not asked this question. To improve the reliability
of our results, we implement Rubin’s (1987) multiple imputation method. For children,
due to problems of both sample size and potential endogeneity, and more in line with the
literature, we cannot employ the same measure of perceived job insecurity which we use
for parents. We therefore measure insecurity using unemployment rates at the province
level, separate by gender and age classes. Our microeconometric results, discussed in
Section 4.4, are consistent with the theoretical prediction that higher job security of the
father deters emancipation.
In Section 5 we present our conclusions. Having established the quantitative im-
portance of the eﬀects of perceived job security on coresidence, we have uncovered
an empirically signiﬁcant link between labor market institutions –labor market rigid-
ity in particular– and family demographics, which brings a new perspective on the
long-standing debate on job security provisions.
32 A model of job insecurity and coresidence
In this section we illustrate how coresidence decisions are related to job insecurity of
parents and children using a dynamic, two-period model of residential choice. Proofs of
the results in this section can be found in Becker et al. (2004).
2.1 The family
The family in our model has n0 parents and n1 + 1 children. We assume that it has
either one or two parents (“the parent” for short) and at least one child. Family size
is denoted by n. Our focus is on the residential choice of one of the children, assuming
that her siblings remain with their parents.
Direct utility is deﬁned over consumption, only. We assume that, in the parental
home, all individuals pool income and consume an equal fraction of total family income.
We root this assumption on the diﬃculty of excluding children from the consumption of
public goods in the household.1 If all family members are coresiding, then consumption




yp + yc ¡ °p
pn
; (1)
where °p is the rent or the imputed cost of housing, p the price index of a representative
basket of consumption goods, yp parental income, and yc the income of the child who is
contemplating to move out (her siblings are assumed to earn no income). We denote the
child’s consumption by cc. If she stays, she gets cn
p. If she moves out, she will consume all
of her income, net of housing costs under independence, °c, plus a non-negative transfer
t from her parents:
ci =
yc + t ¡ °c
p
:




yp ¡ t ¡ °p
p(n ¡ 1)
:
1Considering diﬀerent sharing rules, provided that consumption of individual family members were
monotonic in income, would not change our qualitative results.
4We assume that parents are partially altruistic. They weigh their direct utility by a








u(cp) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(cc); (2)
In what follows, we will in fact use the slightly modiﬁed functional form:
Up = ¸(n0 + n1)u(cp) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(cc) = ¸(n ¡ 1)u(cp) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(cc); (3)
which puts more weight on the utility of the n1 children who always remain at home and
simpliﬁes the algebra signiﬁcantly, while leaving our results qualitatively unchanged.
To obtain sharper results, we conduct all of our analysis with a speciﬁc functional
form for the direct utility from consumption, namely the Constant Relative Risk Aver-
sion (CRRA) form: u(c) = (1 ¡ ®)¡1c1¡®, with ® > 0.2
2.2 Timing
There are two periods. In period 1, parent and child observe their income realizations,
yp1 and yc1. To insure non-negative consumption, we assume there is a lower bound on
income realizations given by the housing costs, °p and °c. A positive income realization
for the parent, interpreted as a draw of yp1 > °p, is equivalent to a job oﬀer, and similarly
for the child. Since there is no disutility from work, job oﬀers are always accepted.3 The
child then decides whether or not to move out. Finally, consumption takes place as a
function of the residential choice of the child.
The main diﬀerence across periods comes from assuming that moving out is irre-
versible, which can be justiﬁed on the grounds that the direct costs from moving, as
well as the social stigma attached to going back to the parental house, tend to make
independence a rather permanent state. Qualitatively similar results would emerge from
considering ﬁnite costs instead. For a child who stayed with her parents in period 1, the
2The results generalize to other commonly used families of functions (such as the Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion case).
3Family member j would require a positive income threshold above °j before accepting a job oﬀer if
there were disutility from work or if individuals were productive while unemployed (through household
production, say). We are ignoring these cases.
5period 2 timing of events and choices repeats itself. If the child has moved out in period
1, however, she faces no residential choice in period 2.
2.3 Period 2
We now characterize the resource allocation and residential decision in period 2. Assum-
ing that the incomes of parent and child have taken the values yp2 and yc2, the optimal







yp2 ¡ ˜ t2 ¡ °p
p(n ¡ 1)
¶
+ (1 ¡ ¸)u
µ











¸ (1 ¡ ¸)u
0 (ci2);
holding with equality when ˜ t2 > 0. Since ¸ > 0:5, this implies that, when she receives
a transfer, the child has lower consumption than the remaining family members. Under
CRRA preferences, the positive transfer is given by:
t2 =
yp2 ¡ °p ¡ (yc2 ¡ °c)Γ(n ¡ 1)
1 + Γ(n ¡ 1)
; (5)
where Γ ´ (¸=(1 ¡ ¸))
1
® > 1.
Using (5), we solve for consumption of the child when receiving a transfer:
ci2 (t2 > 0) =
yc2 + t2 ¡ °c
p
=
yp2 + yc2 ¡ °p ¡ °c
(Γ(n ¡ 1) + 1)p
; (6)
whereas at the parental home per capita consumption is:
c
i
p2 (t2 > 0) =
Γ(yp2 + yc2 ¡ °p ¡ °c)
(Γ(n ¡ 1) + 1)p
:
Comparing (1) and (6), it is easy to see that, when transfers are positive, the impact
of higher income on the child’s consumption is largest for a coresiding child. Indeed, a
child who lives with her parents is entitled to the fraction 1=np of the goods consumed
in the household; if she leaves, she will receive the smaller fraction 1=(Γ(n ¡ 1) + 1)p of
6the family’s joint resources. This is the consequence of partial altruism and the parent’s
inability to limit the consumption of a coresiding child or, stated diﬀerently, it follows
from the child’s greater bargaining power at home relative to independence. While we
ﬁnd this a realistic assumption, the alternatives of full altruism or of identical bargaining
power would not aﬀect our qualitative results.
When a child leaves, the combined resources of the family drop by the cost °c.
Further, since a transfer-recipient child will consume less than per capita consumption
at the parent’s house, a child with income low enough to trigger a transfer would be
made worse oﬀ by moving out. In other words:
ci2 (t2 > 0) < c
n
p2 =
yp2 + yc2 ¡ °p
np
:
We now address the moving out decision for the child who decided to stay at home in
period 1. Deﬁne ∆2 as the excess utility level when independent relative to coresiding,
for period 2:







The child moves out if ∆2 > 0. (If indiﬀerent, ∆2 = 0, we assume she stays.)
How does ∆2 change as a function of yc2? Let us deﬁne ˜ yc2 as the value such that





Given the transfer function, we know that, for values of yc2 such that transfers were
positive, the child’s consumption would be lower if she were to move out. Consequently,
the value that leaves the child indiﬀerent between staying home and moving out, i.e.
∆2 (¯ yc2) = 0, must exceed ˜ yc2. It is given by:
yp2 + ¯ yc2 ¡ °p
np
=









°c > ˜ yc2: (8)
We now characterize formally how ∆2 depends on the child’s income.
4The notation tj (x) omits, for simplicity, other arguments of the function.
7Lemma 1 The function ∆2 (yc2) is strictly negative for yc2 2 [°c; ¯ yc2) and strictly
positive for yc2 > ¯ yc2. Further, ∆2 (yc2) is strictly increasing in the range (˜ yc2; ¯ yc2).
When the relative-risk aversion parameter ® exceeds 1, ∆2 (yc2) is strictly increasing for
yc2 2 (°c; ˜ yc2). When ® is below 1, ∆2 (yc2) is strictly increasing for yc2 > ¯ yc2.
Figure 1A depicts a possible conﬁguration of ∆2 (yc2). As Lemma 1 shows, utility
from independence exceeds that under coresidence for yc2 ¸ ¯ yc2. Thus, a child who did
not move out in period 1, will now leave if her income exceeds ¯ yc2, otherwise she will
stay. On the other hand, the set of income values [°c; ¯ yc2] are a regret region: the child
would prefer to go back home. The sources of regret are the rental cost °c and partial
altruism.
It is worth discussing the ambiguity in the slope of ∆2 (yc2). Since ∆2 corresponds
to a diﬀerence in utility levels, changes in income aﬀect this diﬀerence in two ways.
First, income modiﬁes consumption diﬀerently depending on the residential state. For
example, for yc2 values such that no transfers would be provided to the child (i.e. above
˜ yc2), higher yc2 implies that ci2 is changing by 1=p whereas consumption at home goes
up by 1=np. We label the impact of income changes on the child’s consumption as
the sharing eﬀect. This is, however, not suﬃcient to ensure that ∆2 varies positively
with yc2. The impact on ∆2 depends also on the marginal utility that these changes in
consumption entail. If, for example, ci2 > cn
p2, the marginal utility of consumption at
home is higher than under independence. In the range yc2 > ¯ yc2, this marginal utility
eﬀect counteracts the greater change in ci2 relative to cn
p2. Consequently, although we
know that ci2 will exceed cn
p2 for yc2 > ¯ yc2, we cannot be certain that ∆2 is always
positively sloped in this range. When yc2 2 (˜ yc2; ¯ yc2), by contrast, both eﬀects go in
the same direction, ensuring that ∆2 is positively sloped. For ® < 1 (® governs the
curvature of the utility function) one of the eﬀects unambiguously dominates the other.5
The assumptions that the marginal utility eﬀect dominates for low income and the
sharing eﬀect for high income are reasonable. For low income, it is likely that the
5If ¸ = 0:5 the parent gives an independent child the same fraction 1=n of total resources as at home
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yc2marginal utility eﬀect will assume an important role in the comparison of utilities across
residential states since CRRA preferences satisfy Inada conditions.
The dependence of the residential choice on yp2 is also interesting. Deﬁne ˜ yp2 as the
level of parental income such that t2 (˜ yp2) = 0, and ¯ yp2 as the parental income level
that leaves the child indiﬀerent between moving out and coresiding, ∆2 (¯ yp2) = 0. It is
straightforward to show that ¯ yp2 < ˜ yp2. Then,
Lemma 2 The function ∆2 (yp2) is strictly decreasing for yp2 2 [°p; ˜ yp2) and strictly
negative for yp2 > ¯ yp2. For the latter range of yp2 values, when the relative-risk aversion
parameter ® exceeds unity, ∆2 (yp2) is strictly increasing.
In Figure 1B we depict a possible conﬁguration for ∆2 (yp2). Whether or not ∆2 (°p)
is positive depends on parameter values (speciﬁcally, a large number of family members
n and a small rental cost °c make ∆2 (°p) positive). As Lemma 2 shows, however,
for yp2 > ¯ yp2, ∆2 (yp2) < 0 holds unambiguously, and children of wealthy parents who
stayed home will not move out. Just as with ∆2 (yc2), higher parental income does not
necessarily raise the child’s willingness to stay home. In Figure 1B, ∆2 (yp2) is consistent
with assuming that the marginal utility eﬀect dominates the sharing eﬀect for the range
of positive transfers.
In Figure 2 we plot the curves ˜ yc2 and ¯ yc2 in (yc;yp) space. To the right of the
¯ yc2 (yp2) schedule, the child moves out; to the left she stays. From the point of view of
the moving-out decision taken in period 1, we can also divide the coresidence area into
two parts. To the left of ˜ yc2 (yp2), children who became independent in period 1 will
receive a transfer, i.e. t2 (yc2;yp2) > 0, while to the right they will not. Recall that the
coresidence area is a regret area.
2.4 Period 1
A simpliﬁed presentation of the model’s structure is given in Figure 3. In period 1 the
residential choice is more involved than in period 2, due to irreversibility and the pos-
sibility of regret. Naturally, the latter depends on the likelihood that period 2 incomes
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I γ >will fall to the left of the schedule ¯ yc2 (yp2). So far, we have been silent about the distri-
bution of income, since period 2 decisions are taken after yc2 and yp2 are observed. We
now assume that (yc2;yp2) s F (yc2;yp2), where F (¢) is the joint cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of period 2 income (yc2;yp2), with marginal cdf’s Fc (yc2) and Fp (yp2). We
denote the corresponding probability density functions (pdf’s) by f (yc2;yp2), fc (yc2)
and fp (yp2). F (¢) has support over [°c;1) £ [°p;1).
If F (¢) assigns positive probability to the regret region, staying home in period 1 has
an option value, the value associated with waiting to see the realization of the period 2
income and deciding then whether or not to move out. Just like with any real option,
this value has to be weighted against the potential gains from moving out early on.
Deﬁne as ∆1 the expected excess utility from moving out relative to staying home
conditional on making the optimal residential choice in period 2:































∆1 is deﬁned over the set [°c;1) £ [°p;1).
The ﬁrst two terms in ∆1 represent the expected utility from moving out in period 1.
Given that the child becomes independent in period 1, period 2 utility is also computed
for cc2 = ci2. The terms preceded by a minus sign represent the expected utility from
staying home in period 1. In this case, the child retains the possibility of choosing the
best residential arrangement in period 2. Thus, given yp2, for yc2 · ¯ yc2 (yp2), the child
remains with her parents and cc2 = cn
p2; otherwise she moves out and cc2 = ci2. The
child will move out if ∆1 > 0. When yc2 > ¯ yc2 (yp2), having moved out in period 1 does
not carry any utility loss; therefore, in this range, the terms concerning period 2 utility
























10It is worth examining equation (9) in detail. First of all, the right-hand side is
nonnegative. It represents the diﬀerence between expected utility under coresidence and
under independence, i.e. the gain in expected utility associated with waiting for period
2 before choosing whether or not to move out (the option value). It will be strictly
positive if the cdf F (¢) places positive mass on the regret region. The left-hand side
represents the diﬀerence in period 1 utility from being independent relative to moving
out. The child will move out when this gain exceeds the expected beneﬁt from waiting.
Now we discuss the determination of ¯ yc1, the child’s period 1 moving-out threshold.
As before, it is deﬁned as the root of ∆1, namely, ∆1 (¯ yc1) = 0. We note the following
facts:
Lemma 3 The period 1 schedule ˜ yc1 (yp1) such that, for yc1 > ˜ yc1 (yp1), parents provide
no transfers, is identical to the period 2 function ˜ yc2 (yp2).
This lemma says that, on the space (yc;yp) of incomes, the functions ˜ yc2 (yp) and
˜ yc1 (yp) exactly overlap. Given that the transfer-giving threshold is identical for periods
1 and 2, the left-hand side of equation (9) coincides with the function ∆2 –now with ar-
guments (yc1;yp1). The properties of function ∆2 in terms of (yc2;yp2) were characterized
in Lemmas 1 and 2.
The regret region, namely period 2 income pairs such that the child prefers coresi-
dence, is formally deﬁned as:
R ´ f(yc2;yp2) 2 [°c;1) £ [°p;1) : yc2 · ¯ yc2 (yp2)g:
If the probability of regret is zero, then today’s residential choice becomes static
and depends only on the comparison of the current utility levels attained under the two
residential arrangements. Thus, the residential decision of period 1 is identical to that
of period 2. For the case when there is a positive probability of regret (F (R) > 0), we
can show the following:
11Proposition 4 The period 1 moving-out threshold correspondence ¯ yc1 (yp1), on (yc1;yp1)
space, lies strictly to the right of the corresponding period 2 schedule ¯ yc2 (yp2) if and only
if F (R) > 0. When ® < 1, ¯ yc1 (yp1) is single-valued.
Intuitively, the proposition says that the possibility of future regret makes people
more conservative about moving out.
We are interested in the impact of yp1 on the period 1 moving-out threshold. First,



























or, in more compact notation,
∆2 (¯ yc1;yp1) = ¯ R: (10)
We are ready to state the following result:
Lemma 5 Higher period 1 parental income yp1 raises the child’s moving-out threshold
¯ yc1 (yp1) for ® < 1.
As before, ® < 1 is a suﬃcient condition. The result in the lemma would also follow
under other parameter values provided the sharing eﬀect dominates the marginal utility
eﬀect for yc1 > ¯ yc2.
Let us consider now the impact of expectations. How do diﬀerent distribution func-
tions F(¢) aﬀect ¯ yc1? For simplicity, we assume that the distributions of period 2 incomes
of parent and child are independent, and so: F (yc2;yp2) = Fc (yc2)Fp (yp2). Our pre-
ferred interpretation of insecurity is a measure of the probability that income will assume
a low future realization. In this sense, a natural way of comparing income distributions
is to rank them in terms of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Let F 1
c (yc2) ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominate F 2
c (yc2). Then, F 1
c (yc2) · F 2
c (yc2), for all yc2 values, and the
12expectation over nondecreasing functions of yc2 computed under the distribution F 1
c
exceeds the same expectation under F 2
c . (The same applies to comparisons between
F 1
p (yp2) and F 2
p (yp2)).6
Intuition suggests that if the child received the good news that the distribution of her
second period income had changed from F 2
c to F 1
c , the wealthier child (in expectation)
would be more willing to move out in period 1. Likewise, if the parent’s income was
known, in period one, to be distributed according to F 1
p (yp2) rather than F 2
p (yp2), we
would expect his child to be more reluctant to leave the parental home. As it turns out,
this is not always the case. The reason is the ambiguous impact of higher income on the
excess utility from independence, ∆2, described in Lemmas 1 and 2.
To illustrate the problem, go to Figure 2 and ﬁx a particular value yc2 to the right of
¯ yc2 (yp2). Starting at yp2 = °p and moving up while holding yc2 constant, we move from
the moving-out region into the regret region. Below ˜ yc2 (yp2) parents cannot provide
ﬁnancial help and higher parental income reduces ∆2. But if we increase yp2 to the
point of moving into the positive transfer region, higher parental income may increase
or decrease ∆2. If we restrict the distributions F 1
p, F 2
p, and Fc to put mass only on
combinations of (yc2;yp2) below the schedule ˜ yc2 (yp2), then the result that F 1
p induces a
higher period 1 moving-out threshold relative to F 2
p goes through. Similarly, as we ﬁx a
value for yp2 and increase the child’s income, ∆2 may be increasing or decreasing, but it
unambiguously increases within the no-transfers subset of the regret region. Again, if we
restrict the distributions F 1
c and F 2
c not to put mass on the positive-transfers subset of
the regret region, the intuitive result outlined above will prevail. We formalize it below.
Let F be the set of all pairs of independent distributions functions (Fc;Fp) with
support over ([yc;1);[yp;1)), such that no mass is placed on the positive-transfers











be two elements of F, and assume that F 1
p
6The results associated with ﬁrst- and second-order stochastic dominance require the additional
assumption that income is bounded. That is, yp2 · y¤
p < 1 and yc2 · y¤
c < 1 , so that Fp (°p) =






c) = 1. We omit making this assumption explicit for simplicity.
13ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F 2
p. Let the period 1 moving-out threshold corre-
sponding to F j
















Proposition 7 Let (Fp;F 1
c ) and (Fp;F 2
c ) be two elements of F, and assume that F 1
c
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F 2
c . Let the period 1 moving-out threshold corre-
sponding to F j
c be denoted ¯ yc1 (F j
c). Then, when ® < 1, ¯ yc1 (F 1
c ) · ¯ yc1 (F 2
c ).
Appendix A provides a discussion of how Propositions (6) and (7) can be generalized.7
Lastly, in Appendix A we also address the impact of higher variance of the future
income streams of parent and child on the moving-out decision. We compare the variance
of income under diﬀerent distributions while holding the expected value constant (i.e.
second-order stochastic dominance). We are able to show that a lower variance in the
child’s future income stream makes her less reluctant to leave the parental home. We
get the opposite reaction concerning the variance of parental income. For the parent’s
income, however, since changes in the distribution of income aﬀect the period 1 moving
out threshold only to the extent that they aﬀect period 2 income values within the
regret area, we need to ensure that the distribution of his income shifts so as to raise
the variance of income values in that region speciﬁcally, as opposed to the requirement
that it becomes more volatile over its global range.
Let us now summarize the key results provided by the model as a guide for empirical
work:
(i) The option value. For forward-looking children who are considering emancipation,
given the stochastic nature of future income, staying home with the parents has an option
value. This is the value associated with waiting to see the realization of future incomes
and deciding then whether or not to move. The reason is that moving out and then
back in is costly; in the stylized case of our model, moving out is irreversible. Thus,
depending on her own and her parent’s future income, a child who moved out may come
to regret that she did. In the presence of partial altruism (parents value the child’s
7As to family size, only for the case of ® < 1 and very altruistic parents (¸ = 0:5) is it possible to
show that the ﬁrst period moving-out threshold is lower than the corresponding threshold for a smaller
family (see Becker et al., 2004).
14consumption less than theirs), there will be regret even if parents are wealthy enough to
provide ﬁnancial transfers to independent children.
(ii) Job insecurity. We have considered two dimensions of insecurity or income risk:
changes in expected income and changes in the variance of the future income processes.
Changes in income inﬂuence future regret sometimes in unintuitive ways. The reason
is that higher income not only induces changes in consumption which depend on the
residential state (the sharing eﬀect) but these consumption changes, in turn, aﬀect the
marginal utility from consumption (the marginal utility eﬀect) which also diﬀers across
residential choices. When these eﬀects work in opposite directions, only by imposing
some restriction on parameter values or income distributions is it possible to determine
the impact of income on regret. If the child faces higher expected income, provided the
marginal utility eﬀect dominates at low levels of consumption but is replaced by the
sharing eﬀect at high consumption levels, she will be more eager to leave the parental
home. The eﬀects of higher expected parental income are not prone to a similar gen-
eralization; only under some restrictions on the distribution of future parental income
can we make the statement that higher expected future income will raise the child’s
moving-out threshold. The ambiguous eﬀect of income on regret again limits the gener-
ality of statements concerning the eﬀects of uncertainty on the residential choice. Only
under particular income distributions can we conclude that higher variance in the child’s
income and lower variance in the parent’s (holding the expected value constant in both
cases) make the child more reluctant to leave home.
Thus, the model tells us that job insecurity aﬀects the child’s residential choice. The
direction of the eﬀects of insecurity depends on the aforementioned conditions. Estab-
lishing whether these conditions hold, as well as their quantitative relevance, is largely
an empirical issue which makes it worth considering both macro and microeconomic
evidence. We next turn to this task.
153 Job insecurity of parents and children in the EU
In this section, we test some of the model’s predictions at the macro level. Speciﬁcally, we
aim at testing the theoretical result that higher own expected income induces children to
leave the parental home earlier, while higher expected parental income has the opposite
eﬀect. This is done by estimating the aggregate relationship between coresidence rates
and survey measures of perceived job insecurity for 12 European countries.
For coresidence, we analyze the aggregate fractions of males and females, aged 20-24
and 25-29 years old, who live at the parental home. For this purpose, data from the
European Labor Force Survey is at hand for most EU countries over the period 1983-
2002, but the availability of a measure of perceived job insecurity is much more restricted.
We construct it using the European Commission’s Eurobarometer. The survey asked
individuals whether they had worried over the last year about losing their job or not
ﬁnding one (1984) or to assess the risk of losing their job (1992 and 1997).8 We transform
the available set of individual responses into a 0-1 dummy variable (not insecure-insecure)
and then compute the age- and gender-speciﬁc fractions of individuals who report being
insecure. Data are available for 4 countries in 1984 (3197 individual observations) and
12 countries in 1992 and 1997 (4982 and 5067 observations, respectively). We end up
with 100 cells (16, 36, and 48, for the three years, respectively). Appendix B gives
more details. We also compute job insecurity for people aged 50-59 years old, who are
representative of parents.
Table 1 summarizes the variables for the endpoints, 1984 and 1997. The coresidence
rate naturally falls with age, it is lower for females than for males, and it is higher in
Mediterranean, predominantly Catholic countries –Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece–
and in Finland, than elsewhere in Europe.9 Long-term trends cannot be gauged from
Table 1, which only contains data on four countries for 1984. Patterns are not uniform
8The wording of questions is not the same in all surveys, so that comparability is a relevant concern.
See Appendix B.
9It is striking to ﬁnd that a Nordic country like Finland is in this respect very similar to the
Mediterranean countries. But then note that job insecurity perceived by youth is the second highest in
the Table.
16Table 1: Descriptive statistics on coresidence and perceived job insecurity, 1984 and
1997 (%)
Coresidence Job insecurity Job insecurity
rate perceived by perceived by
youth 50-59 y.o.
1984 1997 1984 1997 1984 1997
A. All 37.6 51.4 26.0 35.5 42.7 44.9
B. Age
20-24 y.o. 55.0 67.0 28.3 36.9
25-29 y.o. 20.2 35.7 23.7 34.1
C. Gender
Male 46.6 59.0 27.6 37.3
Female 28.5 43.7 24.4 33.7
D. Country
Belgium 40.6 33.6 71.0
West Germany 34.5 37.2 17.6 25.2 21.2 47.2
Greece 63.1 34.7 48.6
Spain 75.0 51.7 47.6
France 28.1 35.2 29.2 53.6 59.1 67.2
Ireland 44.8 30.3 33.3
Italy 56.1 75.0 20.1 40.4 36.7 25.9
Netherlands 30.9 34.5 35.6
Austria 47.8 24.8 29.6
Portugal 68.7 29.5 23.9
United Kingdom 31.6 30.8 37.2 24.9 53.9 52.9
Finland 67.1 42.7 55.7
Note: Coresidence rate: percentage of youth population living at parental home. Unemploy-
ment risk: percentage of respondents who think that their job is at risk (See Appendix B for
deﬁnitions). Sources: Coresidence rate: European Labor Force Survey. Unemployment risk:
Eurobarometers 20 (1984) and 47.1 (1997).












United Kingdom -4.84 2.54
Finland 25.75 3.25





Insecurity 5059 -8.76 4.24
No. of observations 100
Adjusted R2 0.956
Note: The table reports, in percentage form, OLS estimates of equation (11). The dependent
variable is the coresidence rate (in %). Descriptive statistics for the data are given in Table 1
and a description of the databases is given in Appendix B. The reference cell is that of males
aged 20-24 y.o. living in Belgium in 1984.
18across the 12 countries in the full period (1983-2002). The above 5 countries plus France
experience upward trends; Belgium and the Netherlands feature mild upward trends only
in the 1990s; and Ireland, Germany, and the UK show mild reductions among those aged
20-24 y.o. and stability in the 25-29 y.o. group. Thus, there is a majority of countries
experiencing an increase in coresidence among the latter group in the 1990s.
Perceived job insecurity is lower among those aged 25-29 y.o. than among the
youngest group, and highest among older people (50-59 y.o.), except in Italy, Portu-
gal, and Spain. It is also somewhat higher for males than for females. Across countries,
young workers feel most insecure in France, Spain, Finland, and Italy, while older workers
do so in Belgium, France, Finland, and the UK.10
Figure 4 represents coresidence and perceived job insecurity for each of the two youth
age and gender groups, pooling together all three years.11 The graph suggests, prima
facie, a positive relationship between the two variables. We test this relationship in a
multivariate framework, by estimating the following regression of Coresidence rates on
job insecurity perceived by youth (Insecurity) and by the older age group (Insecurity
5059):
Coresidenceijt = ®i + ¯ Age 2529 + ± Female + ¸ 1992 + Á 1997
+° Insecurityijt + ½ Insecurity 5059 it + eijt (11)
where the subindex i denotes countries, j age-gender cells, and t = 1984;1992; 1997.
The ®i are country eﬀects, Age 2529 and Female are dummy variables for cells in those
age and gender groups, respectively, 1992 and 1997 are year dummies, and eit is random
noise. The reference cell is that of males aged 20-24 y.o. living in Belgium in 1984.
Estimation results are shown in Table 2. The age- and gender-speciﬁc dummies
conﬁrm the features apparent in Table 1, and the year dummies suggest an upward
10B¨ ockerman (2002), using individual data from a survey for 15 EU countries plus Norway in 1998,
ﬁnds that perceived job insecurity increases with age but does not vary with gender, and also large
cross-country diﬀerences after controling for a long list of variables (it is largest in Spain, Greece, and
Italy).
11Legenda: BE Belgium, GE Germany, GR Greece, SP Spain, FR France, IR Ireland, IT Italy, NL

































































































































































Figure 4. Coresidence and youth job insecurity (1984,1992,1997) trend. The country dummies should mainly capture cross-country cultural diﬀerences,
i.e. diﬀerences in preferences about coresidence –importance of family ties, attitudes
regarding partnership formation, taste for independence, etc.–, and also in the costs of
moving out for youths –availability and cost of rental and owner-occupied housing–, to
the extent that these aspects have remained constant over time. They are signiﬁcant
and, net of age and gender composition eﬀects, they identify the same ﬁve countries
mentioned above as having high coresidence rates.
Most importantly, Table 2 reveals that once these characteristics are controlled for,
job insecurity perceived by youth signiﬁcantly raises the coresidence rate, while job
insecurity of older age groups –proxying for the parents– lowers that rate. In particular,
a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of youths who perceive their job to be
insecure is associated, ceteris paribus, with an increase in the coresidence rate of 1.3
percentage points, while a corresponding increase in the fraction of workers in their 50s
is associated with a reduction of 0.9 percentage points. In other words, if the percentage
of youths feeling insecure went from 0 to 100, the coresidence rate would increase by
13 percentage points, and the same change in the percentage of older wokers would
reduce coresidence by 9 percentage points. This is not a negligible change, given that
the average coresidence rate in the data is 47%. Moreover, the inclusion of the two job
insecurity variables reduces the standard deviation of the country dummy coeﬃcients
by 3.1%, i.e. it explains part of the variation in coresidence rates across countries.
There is a large literature analyzing the determinants of perceived job insecurity
in the US (e.g. Manski and Straub, 2000), the UK (e.g. Green et al., 2000) and
other European countries (OECD, 1997; B¨ ockerman, 2002). Diﬀerences in perceived job
insecurity depend on national idiosyncrasies and on diﬀerences in youth unemployment
rates, as well as in underlying labor market institutions, such as employment protection
legislation and unemployment beneﬁts. Taking the degree of perceived job insecurity as
given, our goal is to show that it is related to coresidence. The aggregate evidence for
European countries we have uncovered indicates that, once cross-country diﬀerences in
culture and institutions have been controlled for, job insecurity of parents and children
20inﬂuence in a signiﬁcant way the coresidence choices of European youth.
Next, we test with micro-data the possibility that job insecurity of parents and
children inﬂuences the moving out decision of the latter. We can do this only for Italy
because this is the single country for which we found suitable data, which are described
in the following section.
4 Microeconometric evidence for Italy
In this section we integrate the macro evidence just presented with micro evidence, by
estimating the extent to which job insecurity of parents aﬀects the decision of children
to leave home in Italy.
4.1 Data and sample design
We use a representative sample of Italian individuals (the “children”) of working age
(more precisely, between 18 and 35 y.o.) and living with their parents. This sample has
been extracted from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). We
use the 1995 wave of this survey, which contains information on 8135 households and
23924 individuals, to select our baseline sample. We then use the 1998 wave to obtain
information on whether a child has left home between 1995 and 1998. Our goal is to
test whether a measure of job insecurity of the father aﬀects this decision, controlling
for observable confounding factors measured in 1995 or before.12
A ﬁrst diﬃculty in the construction of our data comes from the fact that the eman-
cipation decision of children (the outcome) can only be observed for households which
have been interviewed in both 1995 and 1998. Only 2699 of the 8135 households satisfy
this condition and, thus, our analysis can only focus on this subset of the original SHIW
sample.13 Note, however, that since these panel households were randomly selected,
12We focus on job insecurity of fathers, not of both parents, because the labor participation rate
of married women is low in Italy. Nevertheless, we also control for whether the mother works in our
empirical analysis, in order to capture the availability of public goods such as household services.
13See Banca d’Italia (1997, 2000).
21they are still representative of the reference population. So this data limitation should
only reduce the eﬃciency of our estimates, not their reliability.
In our empirical investigation we will use an unusual measure of perceived job inse-
curity, which we will describe in detail below, constructed from the answers to a survey
question in which individuals are asked about the probability of having a job in the
following year. This question has been designed carefully to measure various dimensions
of how uncertainty is perceived and is the main reason why the 1995 wave of the SHIW
is particularly useful for our purposes.
It has two problems, however. First, only individuals who are either working or
unemployed are asked about their job prospects. This excludes retired “house-husbands”
and students. In principle, we could have considered retired fathers as having a sort of
perfectly secure job, since they are in large part individuals who enjoy perfectly safe
incomes. We do not do so because retired fathers are more likely to be at home all day,
and this might aﬀect the emancipation decision of children for reasons diﬀerent from
the pure eﬀect of job security. Another reason to drop households with retired fathers
is that to be completely sure about having no unemployment in the subsequent year
is not equivalent to being sure for life because of retirement. Since we are interested
in emancipation, we also restrict the sample to children aged up to 35 years old in
1995. These criteria, while required by the focus of our analysis, reduce the sample
considerably, to 1142 children, but note that this sample is still representative of the
population of children living in households where fathers are not retired in 1995.14 The
characteristics of this sample are described in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3.
The second data problem related to the question on perceived uncertainty is that
to limit the length of the questionnaire this question has not been asked to labor force
members in all households, but only to labor force members in households in which the
head-husband was born in an odd year.15 Thus, our measure of perceived uncertainty
14To be included in the sample, children must also be still alive, not in jail and not long-term
hospitalized in 1998; these restrictions only aﬀect a marginal number of observations.
15Other questions were asked in households where the father was born in even years.
22is available only for household members belonging to the intersection between the panel
subset of the SHIW and the subset in which information on job insecurity was collected.
As a result, only for 479 of the households described in the ﬁrst two columns of Table
3 we observe a measure of perceived job insecurity of fathers and only for 212 of these
households we have also an analogous measure for children. It is important to note that
while the sampling design ensures that the 479 households for which paternal insecurity
is available are on average observationally equivalent to the 1142 households for whom
we have two years of data (see the last two columns of Table 3), this is not true for the
212 households for which the information is available for both fathers and children. The
reason is that the question has not been asked to all individuals born in odd years, but
to all individuals belonging to households in which the father was born in odd years.16
These features of the data bring good and a bad news. The good news is that we are
in the perfect condition to apply the Multiple Imputation method proposed by Rubin
(1987)17 to impute perceived job insecurity to the fathers for whom this information is
missing. As explained in Section 4.3 the reason is that, by construction, the missing
information is missing “completely at random”, which is a crucial necessary condition
for the application of Rubin’s method. The bad news is that since for children the
information is not missing at random we cannot use the same imputation procedure.
Moreover, the number of observations for which the information is available for children
and fathers together is so small that any other imputation strategy for children would
give unreliable results. Thus, for children we cannot use the measure of job insecurity
constructed on the basis of the SHIW question.
Before moving to a more detailed description of our indicators of job insecurity and
children emancipation, let us note again that while data limitations force us to use a
relatively small sample, this sample is still representative of the population of interest
16A careful reader may wonder why the information on job insecurity is available only for 479 fathers
and not for 571 = 1142=2 fathers, if it was asked to fathers born in odd years. The reason is that
some fathers did not respond to the question. The comparison of observables in Table 3 clearly shows,
however, that the cases of non-response are randomly distributed in the data.
17See also, more recently, Rubin (1996).
23Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the econometric analysis. 1995
Full sample Restricted sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 22.57 3.61 22.59 3.54
Female 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50
Homeownership 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45
Father’s age 52.23 5.37 51.85 5.11
Father’s years of schooling 9.24 4.12 9.40 4.11
Number of kids 2.37 1.04 2.36 0.87
Wealth 0.34 0.50 0.34 0.55
Mother employed 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48
Rental index 6.44 2.11 6.30 2.19
Northwest 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33
Northeast 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37
Center 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38
South 0.36 0.48 0.43 0.50
Islands 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31
U rate in kid’s age-gender-province cell 0.39 0.23 0.41 0.23
Father’s perceived job insecurity – – 0.16 0.28
Out in 1998 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.20
Descriptive statistics of variables measured in 1995 for the full sample of 1142 children who:
² live with both of their parents in 1995,
² belong to households interviewed in both 1995 and 1998,
² are aged between 18 and 35 years old in 1995,
² have a father who is either employed or unemployed (i.e. not retired),
² are still alive, not in jail and not long-term hospitalized in 1998,
and for the restricted sample of 479 children whose father answered the question concerning
perceived uncertainty. Therefore father’s perceived job insecurity is recorded only for the
restricted sample. Monetary variables are in millions of Italian Liras.
24(see Table 3). Moreover, its timing structure is suitable for exploring the relationship
between job insecurity (in particular paternal insecurity) and the subsequent (not con-
temporaneous) decisions of children to leave home controlling for a large set of individual
and family background characteristics.
4.2 The indicators of job insecurity and the outcome variable
The ﬁrst key variable in our analysis is the reply to the following question, posed to
employed and unemployed individuals:18
What are the chances that in the next 12 months you will keep your job or ﬁnd one
(or start a new activity)? In other words, if you were to assign a score between 0
and 100 to the chance of keeping your job or of ﬁnding one (or of starting a new
activity), what score would you assign? (“0” if you are certain not to work, “100”
if you are certain to work). [A graphic scale going from 0 to 100 is shown to the
respondent.]
In this paper, we use the complementary probability, namely, the probability of unem-
ployment.
As described in Guiso et al. (2002), the full sample of individuals who were asked this
question in 1995 contains 4799 individuals, which become 4205 after non-respondents
(8%) are excluded. Note also that those who expected to voluntarily retire or drop from
the labor force are excluded. Their answers attest to the high degree of job security
enjoyed by workers in Italy: the 4th decile is zero, the median is 30%, a 50% chance of
unemployment is reached only in the 8th decile, and only 3% of individuals are certain
to be unemployed in the year following the interview.19 The authors also compare
this source, restricting the sample to those employed, with the Survey of Economic
18Note that those who answer “yes” to the question “Do you expect to voluntarily retire or stop
working in the next 12 months?” are not asked this question.
19The authors point out that it is not clear if employed respondents report only involuntary job losses
or any change in employment status (including job mobility).
25Table 4: The indicator of perceived job insecurity: observed and imputed with the
multiple imputation method
Value of the Observed Observed and imputed
indicator Percent Cumul. Percent Cumul.
0.0 60.13 60.13 45.88 45.88
0.1 11.27 71.40 12.22 58.11
0.2 7.93 79.33 11.70 69.81
0.3 1.88 81.21 7.83 77.64
0.4 2.71 83.92 6.71 84.34
0.5 4.80 88.73 5.95 90.30
0.6 0.63 89.35 2.80 93.10
0.7 2.09 91.44 2.12 95.22
0.8 2.71 94.15 1.96 97.18
0.9 1.88 96.03 1.02 98.20
1.0 3.97 100.00 1.80 100.00
Total 100.00 100.00
Distribution of the indicator of job insecurity of fathers in the sample 479 observations used in
the econometric analysis (see Table 3). The indicator measures the probability assigned by the
individual to the event that he does not work in the following year. Job insecurity imputations
reported in the right-hand side of the table were estimated using the multiple imputation
method. The column ‘Observed’ refers to the 479 observations for which information on
father’s perceived job insecurity is non-missing. The column “Observed and imputed” refers
to all 1142 observations in the sample.
Expectations (SEE), which contains a similar question for employed workers in the US.20
While in Italy 59% of individuals report a zero chance of unemployment, in the US only
31% do so. The cumulated fraction of respondents for each probability of unemployment
is systematically lower in the US than in Italy up to a 10% probability (at the 7th decile),
after which it becomes similar.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 report the distribution of the perceived uncertainty
indicator for the fathers of our sample of 479 households in Table 3. It is easy to see that,
as expected given the sample design, our sample is not very diﬀerent from the full sample
20“I would like you to think about your employment prospects over the next 12 months. What do you
think is the percent chance that you will lose your job during the next 12 months?”. See Manski and
Straub (2000).
26used by Guiso et al. (2002). In our case, the average perceived unemployment probability
of fathers is slightly smaller (20% vis-` a-vis 22%) but this makes sense, since in our
sample individuals are older (they must have a child of working age) and the perceived
probability of unemployment drops with age. For the same reason, the probability mass
at zero expected unemployment is also lower (53%).
As previously explained, we cannot use the same question of the SHIW to obtain
an indicator of perceived uncertainty for children. Thus we simply include a measure
of labor market tightness for children among the controls. Speciﬁcally, we use unem-
ployment rates at the province level (separate by gender and age class) obtained from
Quarterly Labor Force statistics. In the case of fathers, who are typically characterized
by employment rates which are very high and constant across provinces and ages, we
are lucky to have a subjective measure of job insecurity, because unemployment rates
would be less informative on the individual-speciﬁc degree of insecurity faced by prime-
age males. In the case of children, provincial unemployment rates by age and gender
have the potential to capture their labor prospects adequately. Moreover, in the case of
children the subjective perception of the likelihood of being employed in the future may
reﬂect a labor supply decision and would therefore be endogenous for the purposes of
our analysis (i.e. it might capture the following sequence: “I have decided not to work
and thus I expect that I will not have a job”). This is less likely to be a problem in
the case of fathers, for whom the expectation of future unemployment is more likely to
be due to a perceived exogenous shock more than to an increase in the preference for
leisure.21
Finally, as far as the outcome variable is concerned, it is a dummy variable taking
the value 1 if the child left the household between 1995 and 1998 and it is described in
the last row of Table 3. Of the 1142 children living with their parents in 1995 on which
our analysis is based, only 40 (4%) decided to leave home in the following three years
(21 females and 19 males). Proportions are similar in the subset of 479 households for
21In other words, we do not think it is likely, given sample participation rates for fathers, that the
father would stop working in order to make the child leave home.
27which paternal perceived uncertainty is available.
4.3 Imputations of perceived job insecurity
It is unfortunate that the SHIW asks the question concerning job insecurity only to half
of the potential sample, but at least this half is selected randomly on the basis of the
year of birth (odd or even) of the household head. Thus, using the terminology of the
literature on missing data (see, for example, Little and Rubin, 1987), we can safely say
that the missing information is “missing completely at random”. We are therefore in
a relatively good position to increase the size of our sample, by imputing the missing
data on the basis of the available information using the procedure known as “Multiple
imputation”.22
Multiple imputation is a procedure based on the replacement of each missing value
with a vector of M ¸ 2 simulated values. Within a Bayesian framework, these simulated
values are obtained as random draws from the posterior distribution of the missing data
given the observed data and some prior distribution. As a result, M imputed data
sets are obtained, one for each of the multiple imputations. Therefore, in each of these
datasets the observed information is the same while the imputed information diﬀers. The
main analysis of interest is then conducted in each of the M imputed datasets, producing
M estimates of the coeﬃcient of interest. Denoting by ˆ ¯i the estimate obtained from the
















22See Rubin (1987) and more recently Rubin (1996).
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M ¡ 1
: (14)
The total variability associated with ¯ ¯M is therefore




where (M + 1)=M is an adjustment for ﬁnite M. For signiﬁcance tests and interval
estimates, the estimand ¯ is distributed according to a t distribution with mean ¯ ¯M,
variance TM, and degrees of freedom approximated by









The results reported in the next section are obtained with the strategy described
above on the basis of M = 5 multiple imputations. As shown in Rubin (1987), p. 114,
this small number of imputations is suﬃcient, under normal circumstances, to achieve
eﬃciency.23 The last two columns of Table 4 report the distribution of the indicator
of perceived uncertainty for the full sample of 1142 fathers, where the indicator has
been imputed with the procedure described above for the 663 observations for which it
was missing at random. The imputed distribution displays a lower frequency of zero
uncertainty but otherwise appears fairly similar to the observed distribution.
4.4 Results
Table 5 reports estimates of the marginal eﬀects of our measures of job insecurity for
fathers and children on the probability that children leave home within three years
from the baseline. Ideally, we would like to base these estimates on a comparison of
children who share all relevant personal and family characteristics potentially aﬀecting
the outcome, so that we can isolate the eﬀect of the treatment, job insecurity. We try
23A free-ware software package written by Joe Schafer (Department of Statistics, Pennsylvania State
University) available at http://www.stat.psu.edu/jls/misoftwa.html has been used to generate the M
imputed datasets and to aggregate the estimates. This software assumes a normally distributed model.
29to approximate this ideal condition by controlling for a large set of variables dated in
1995, when all children are observed coresiding, or before. For children, we control for
their age, gender, and completed years of schooling.24 Emancipation decisions are likely
to be aﬀected by both family traits and the current situation in the household. So,
we condition on the father’s age and completed years of schooling.25 We also control
for family wealth, home-ownership (owner-occupied = 1), number of children present
in the household, and region of residence (through 5 dummy variables for North-West,
North-East, Center, South and Islands, with the North-West becoming the reference).
Finally, since the availability of aﬀordable housing plays a crucial role in the decision to
move out, we include as controls also housing price indicators at the province level.26
Table 5 does not report estimates for all these controls, however, in order to save space
and focus attention on the marginal eﬀects of interest.27
The ﬁrst row of Table 5 displays estimates based on the restricted sample of 479
observations for which the uncertainty perceived by fathers is observed. Using a linear
probability model (ﬁrst column), if the job insecurity perceived by a father goes from zero
(sure to be employed next year) to 1 (sure to be unemployed next year), the probability
that the child leaves home increases by 9.3 percentage points (remember that the average
probability of emancipation in the sample is 0.04). Despite the small sample size, this
estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and relatively large in absolute size. A probit
model (third column) produces a more conservative estimate of the marginal eﬀect of
24The child’s schooling is likely to be endogenous with respect to her residential choice, and so our
preferred regression excludes schooling. Including this variable, however, would allow us to control in
part for the child’s expectations concerning the level of her future income, a variable the model predicts
as relevant in the residence choice. For this reason, we performed robustness checks by including
schooling as a regressor, with unchanged results.
25Notice that, to the extent that father’s age and schooling control for the father’s income level when
employed, and since unemployment beneﬁts are proportional to previous wages in Italy, the degree of
perceived job insecurity measures (the complement of ) the probability that the parent will get his full
wages, as opposed to the corresponding unemployment beneﬁts. For this two-point support distribution
of parental income (employment wages versus unemployment beneﬁts), a reduction in perceived job
insecurity exactly captures the notion of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance used in the model.
26These data have been purchased from Nomisma S.p.a. We also tried including a dummy capturing
whether the household owned a second house, but it was not signiﬁcant.
27The full set of results is of course available from the authors.




Imputed sample 1 0.073 0.046
(0.023) (0.015)
Imputed sample 2 0.092 0.054
(0.022) (0.014)
Imputed sample 3 0.131 0.064
(0.023) (0.015)
Imputed sample 4 0.107 0.056
(0.023) (0.015)




The ﬁrst column displays the coeﬃcient of a linear probability model. The second column
shows the marginal eﬀects of a probit model. The ﬁrst row shows results on the non-imputed
subsample (479 observations). Rows 2-6 show the results on the ﬁve multiple imputation
samples described in Table (4) (1142 observations). Row 7 shows aggregate estimates and
standard errors based on Rubin’s formula as described in the main text. Numbers in brackets
are standard errors.
31a similar change of paternal insecurity (3.6 percentage points), but the estimate is still
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and large with respect to the starting point.
The next ﬁve rows of the Table display the results obtained in ﬁve diﬀerent samples
in which the insecurity perceived by parents has been imputed using the procedure
described in Section 4.3. In all these samples, the estimated marginal eﬀect is large
and statistically signiﬁcant for both the linear probability and the probit models. When
these ﬁve estimates are aggregated using equations (12) and (15), the results obtained
in the restricted sample are conﬁrmed and, actually, the estimated marginal eﬀects are
slightly higher, particularly in the case of the probit model.
We conclude that, as far as paternal job insecurity is concerned, the insight of our
theoretical model is fully conﬁrmed. A child is signiﬁcantly more likely to leave home
when his/her father perceives that the possibility of not having a job in the future is
high.
The variable controlling for labor market tightness facing children, namely the provin-
cial unemployment rate, yields the following estimated coeﬃcients (standard errors):
0.121 (0.083) for the linear probability model, and 0.075 (0.047) for the probit. Thus
the marginal eﬀects are estimated to be positive but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. This result probably reﬂects the fact that provincial unemployment rates, even if
disaggregated by age and gender, are not suﬃciently informative on the degree of job
insecurity faced or perceived by young adults. In other words, more than rejecting the
prediction our model concerning job security of children, we see this result as inviting
us to suspend the verdict until an informative measure of perceived job insecurity for
children is available.28
28For completeness, we report that the number of children in the household is a statistically insignif-
icant regressor. The model predicted an ambiguous eﬀect of this variable on the residence choice of the
child, as shown in Becker et al. (2004).
325 Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored one potential determinant of the youth’s decision to
leave their parents’ home. Our key insight was that it may depend on the degree of
job security of parents and children. To address this issue, we presented a theoretical
model. It predicted, under certain conditions, that higher own expected income induces
children to leave the parental home earlier, while higher expected parental income has
the opposite eﬀect.
We have shown that the aggregate evidence for 12 European Union member countries
in the 1980s and 1990s on emancipation rates, for the 20-24 and 24-29 year-old brackets,
and on perceived job insecurity is consistent with this hypothesis. According to our
estimates, if the percentage of youths feeling that their job is insecure went from 0 to
100, the coresidence rate would have increases by 13 percentage points, while the same
change in the percentage of workers aged 50-59 y.o. would have reduced coresidence by
9 percentage points. We read this evidence as suggesting that job security is a consistent
explanatory variable of coresidence decisions across countries, once adequate control for
diﬀerences in institutions and culture is performed.
We were further able to validate the job security hypothesis using microeconomic
panel data from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), collected
by the Bank of Italy. We estimated linear probability and probit models controlling for
children’s, father’s and family characteristics, and imputing perceived job insecurity for
a fraction of the individuals in the sample. With this sample, however, we could not use
a measure of perceived job insecurity for children. Our empirical results indicate that
the likelihood young Italians aged 18 to 35 years old left the parental home between
1995 and 1998 is positively related to parental job insecurity, measured in terms of their
father’s own perception of his chances of having a job over the subsequent 12 months.
Going from a perception of a fully secure job to a perception of a certain job loss (or
of the inability to ﬁnd a new job) raised the likelihood of the child leaving by 4 to 10
percentage points, depending on the sample and estimation method used. This is a quite
33substantial increase given that the average probability of emancipation observed in the
sample is 4%.
Having established the quantitative importance of the eﬀects of perceived job security
on coresidence, and given that labor market institutions are important determinants of
the relative job insecurity of parents and children, our results uncover an empirically
signiﬁcant link between labor market institutions –labor market rigidity in particular–
and family demographics.
What are the policy implications of our analysis? The main direct eﬀects of late youth
emancipation are low fertility, which for instance puts in jeopardy pension systems in
southern European countries, and low geographical mobility, leading to a lower capacity
to react to idiosyncratic regional shocks. Both of these problems are constantly debated
in southern European countries but we are the ﬁrst to link them to the problem of
coresidence through the eﬀect of job security provisions. Coresidence also has beneﬁtial
implications: society as a whole may gain from it if parents can monitor the job search
activities of their children better than public employment agencies, and thus decide on
the size of the provision of “unemployment beneﬁts” within the family. In conclusion,
what is socially desirable as far as these outcomes are concerned is debatable, but,
whatever the result of this debate, our analysis shows that it should also take into account
the eﬀects of job security provisions for parents and children on youth emancipation.
34A The eﬀect of income distribution functions on the
period 1 moving-out threshold
Generalization of the results on ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. In this sec-
tion, we discuss how to generalize Propositions 6 and 7. We begin by deﬁning the set F
more formally.
Let ΩF denote the set of all pairs of independent distribution functions (Fc;Fp) such
that Fc has support over [°c;1) and Fp has support over [°p;1). We now deﬁne a
convenient subset F of ΩF:
F =
½
(Fc;Fp) 2 ΩF : Fc (yc2)Fp (yp2) = 0 for (yc2;yp2)
such that yc2 < ˜ yc2 (yp2)
¾
.
In words, the distributions Fc and Fp in F are independent and assign mass zero to the
strict subset of the regret region where transfers would be granted to children living on
their own.
The condition ® < 1 invoked in propositions 6 and 7 could be generalized by imposing
that the sharing eﬀect dominate the marginal utility eﬀect for income values such that
the second-period residential choice would be independence. This would ensure that
the function ∆2 (yc2) is monotonically increasing to the right of ¯ yc2; consequently, the
income threshold ¯ yc1 for which the child is exactly indiﬀerent between moving out and
staying at home in period 1 would be the unique solution to ∆2 (yc1) = ¯ R; further, it
would also ensure that ¯ yc1 is monotonic in ¯ R.
How could propositions 6 and 7 be generalized, allowing Fp and Fc to place mass on
the entire (yc2;yp2) plane? Consider ﬁrst the child’s income. As argued in Lemma 1, the
ambiguity of the slope of ∆2 (yc) when transfers are positive hinges on the dominance
of the sharing versus the marginal utility eﬀect. If, as argued then, we assume that the
marginal utility eﬀect dominates for yc2 2 [°c; ˜ yc2 (yp)], then ∆2 (yc2) is positively sloped
and strictly increasing for yc2 anywhere in the regret region.29 The next lemma makes
this point formally.
Lemma 8 Let (Fp;F 1
c ) and (Fp;F 2
c ) be two elements of ΩF, and assume that F 1
c ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates F 2
c . Let the period 1 moving-out threshold corresponding
to F j
c be denoted ¯ yc1 (F j
c). Then, if the sharing eﬀect dominates the marginal utility
eﬀect for yc2 · ˜ yc2 (yp) and ® < 1, ¯ yc1 (F 1
c ) · ¯ yc1 (F 2
c ).
While the prevalence of the marginal utility eﬀect will not allow a similar generaliza-
tion for the parent’s income distribution,30 a continuity argument helps us analyze the
29Recall that one instance where the marginal utility eﬀect prevails over sharing is the case where
the parent values child consumption just as much as his, ¸ = 0:5.
30Altruism imposes the equality of @∆2=@yc2 and @∆2=@yp2 in the range of positive transfers. How-
ever, for the subset of income values such that the parent does not provide ﬁnancial help but the child
still prefers to be at home (yc2 2 [˜ yc2; ¯ yc2]), @∆2=@yc2 and @∆2=@yp2 must have opposite signs. The
lack of transfers causes yp2 to beneﬁt the child only if she is at home (@∆2=@yp2 < 0), whereas higher
yc2 is always more beneﬁcial to an independent child (@∆2=@yc2 > 0). This implies that, when ∆2 (yc2)
is increasing everywhere in the regret region, ∆2 (yp2) must have an increasing and a decreasing range
in that region.
35case when Fp places mass over [°p;1). What is required is that, for given values of the
child’s period 2 income, the changes in ¯ R associated with diﬀerent distributions Fp be
driven by values of ∆2 in the no-transfer region. In other words, the density placed by
diﬀerent distributions Fp on yp2 values above ˜ yp2 (yc2) cannot be too large.
Second-order stochastic dominance. Let us address the impact of higher variance
of the future income streams of parent and child on the moving-out decision. We compare
the variance of income under diﬀerent distributions while holding the expected value
constant. That is, using the child’s income as an example, we say:
Deﬁnition 9 F 1
c (y) dominates distribution F 2




yF 1 (y)dy =
R
yF 2 (y)dy, and
ii)
R yc
°c [F 1 (z) ¡ F 2 (z)]dz · 0, with the inequality holding for all yc in the domain of
the child’s income.
Proposition 10 Let (Fp;F 1
c ) and (Fp;F 2
c ) be two elements of F such that F 1
c dominates
F 2
c in the second-order stochastic sense. Then, ¯ yc1 (F 1
c ) · ¯ yc1 (F 2
c ).
A similar result can be obtained for parental income. However, since changes in the
distribution of income aﬀect the period 1 moving out threshold only to the extent that
they aﬀect period 2 income values within the regret area, for the parent’s income we
need to ensure that the distribution of his income shifts so as to raise the variance of
income values in that region speciﬁcally, as opposed to the requirement that it becomes
more volatile over its global range. That is, if F 1
p dominates F 2
p in the second-order
stochastic sense, we need additionally to impose that, for all values of the child’s income









p (yp2)dyp2 = 0; (17)
which, together with the conditions that ensure the second-order stochastic dominance
of F 1
p over F 2





















be two elements of F satisfying equation
(17), such that F 1
p dominates F 2












Proposition 10 says that a lower variance in the child’s future income stream makes
her less reluctant to leave the parental home. We get the opposite reaction concerning
parental income: the child demands a higher income level in period 1 in order to move
out if the parent faces a lower variance income stream.
36B Description of macroeconomic data
Coresidence rate. Fraction of population living at parental home. Source: European
Labour Force Survey. Countries: all in the EU. Years: 1983-2002, though data start
later for new EU members.
Perceived job insecurity. 0-1 dummy variable constructed from answers to questions
asked in the Eurobarometers (asterisks mark the answers considered as 1 in the dummy
variable):
² April 1984: ”During the last year, have you (or someone in your household) worried
about losing a job or not ﬁnding a job?”. Replies: 1. A lot (*). 2. A little. 3. Not
at all.
² April-May 1992: ”And in the future, how great a risk do you think there is that
you will become unemployed?”. Replies: 1. No risk. 2. Quite a low risk. 3. Quite
a high risk (*). 4. A very high risk (*).
² March-April 1997: ”How likely do you think it is that you may lose your job in
the next few years?”. Replies: 1. 0%, no risk at all. 2. 25%, low risk. 3. 50%,
ﬁfty-ﬁfty (*). 4. 75%, high risk (*). 5. 100%, deﬁnitely will (*).
Countries available:
² 1984: West Germany, France, Italy, and United Kingdom. Data on Belgium and
Ireland had missing values and had to be excluded.
² 1992 and 1997: Belgium, Western Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy
(not in 1992), Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, and United Kingdom.
Data on Luxembourg were excluded because several cells showed zero insecurity, due
to the small number of observations included in the cells. We also exclude Italy in 1992
because the data show a very sharp drop in insecurity which then bounces back in 1997,
again presumably due to the small number of observations.
We construct the job insecurity variable from 16483 individual observations for 4
countries in 1984 (3197 individual observations) and 12 countries in 1992 and 1997
(4982 and 5067 observations, respectively). They are constructed for cells by gender,
age group (20-24, 25-29, and 50-59 years old), country, and year. To construct the cells,
each individual observation is weighted by its population weight as given by the survey.
We end up with 100 observations (16, 36, and 48, for the 3 years, respectively).
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